For any system with limited statistical knowledge, the combination of evidence and the interpretation of sampling information requires the determination of the right reference class (or of an adequate one). The present note (1) discuss es the use of reference classes in evidential reasoning, and (2) discusses a first implementation of Kyburg's rules for reference classes, and what we now know about implementing such a system in the future. This paper contributes the first frank discuss ion of how much of Kyburg's system is needed to be powerful; how much can be computed effectively, and how much is philosophical fat.
1. Reference Classes.
AI discussions on probability have perenially revolved around two problems: what to do with conflicting evidence, and how to get by without a lot of objective statistical knowledge. Each of these problems can be addressed by an adequate theory of how reference classes are selected.
Hans Reichenbach left modern philosophers of probability with a single task: in order to determine an event's probability, determine the narrowest reference class to which the event belongs, and about which adequate statistics are known [Rei49] . Suppose I know about the next Mets game, "m", that it is one in which Dwight Gooden will pitch, "Dm", and one to be played at home, "Hm", and one in which Keith Hernandez will bat, "Km"; I want to know the probability that the game will be a Mets' victory, P("Vm"). Some are willing to supply the missing numbers, e.g., "%(H& D& K, V)", by procedure or by fiat. But A.I. has left the age when inventing such numbers was condoned. So something must be done with the statistics that are legitimately known.
According to Reichenbach and his followers, if
" is adequately precise, say a narrow interval, then it gives the probability of the win. This is because "H & D" defines a narrower class than "H ".
Statistics for the narrowest class may not be available.
Suppose "m" is an "M" game, "Mm" is true, where "M" is the predicate that individuates "m": i.e., "games identical to m". "M" could be analyzed into, say, the open sentence,
Then "M" defines the narrowest class to which m belongs. But "%(M, V)" is surely not known, or else P("Vm") is a trivial query. We don't usually want the probability to come from statistics on V ' s among M's.
Rules are needed to point out that only the "H & D"
part of "M" is useful here. Systems of probability have been constructed on such rules.
Reichenbachian rules say what to do with evidence when it is conflicting or incomplete. When appropriate, the rules mandate combination of evidence via purely set-theoretic axioms. Set theory allows the construction of "%" statements from other "%' statements. At other times, the rules throw out information that is simply irrelevant. Discarding irrelevant information is natural in evidential reasoning though it is suppressed by the applied statistician in practice. Rules governing this practice need to be made explicit.
There is a close analogy to Bayesian methods. If "Hm& Dm& Km " is the total evidence, then P( "Vm") is given by
Suppose, however, that this conditional is not known and that what is known is just '
P<"Vm")"Hm & Dm") and P<"Vm")"Hm").
Then some logical principles should determine that the total relevant, or total useful knowledge is "Hm & In order to determine the probability of t, a sentence in a formal language, relative to a base of knowledge,
1. Find statements of the form: "t • (x E Zl";
i.e., isolate the events relevant to determining the probability in question;
e.g., "I win bet b • m E the set of Mets victories".
2. Now for each sentence "x E Y", i.e., for some property Y of x, e.g., "m E the set of home games: {x : Hx}" find the strongest statistical statement for property Z
A statistical statement is stronger than another if the first's [p, q] interval is nested in the other's. These are the potentially useful statistics. Y's are "candidate" reference classes.
3. The 4-tuple <x, Y, Z, [p, q) > is an "inference structure for t."
4. Collect all such inference structures and call the set S.
5. Find IS•, the strongest member of S (the one with the strongest statistics) that "dominates" every member of S that "disagrees" with it (these are defined below). Here's the achievement. Distinguish probability assertion,
from statements about specific frequencies in classes,
Then provide rules for selecting among such frequency statements in order to determine probability.
Whatever information used to be used to determine or When the knowledge base contains:
it should also contain:
i.e., an inference structure based on
The product class is always a candidate inference structure, and it embeds a kind of independence assumption. It reflects the inference structures based respectively on Hand on K.
It will almost always be dominated, in turn, by the inference structure based on the class:
"{<x,y> :x E Handy E Kand x E V • y E V}".
<ISXB>
And the per cent of these that are in V x V is
g (x, y) = xy/(1-x-y + 2xyJ, which is easily calculated. Using this inference structure would also be like making a kind of independence assumption (in this system, a provably better one, when evidence about the same event is combined).
But it too can't be used unless it dominates all others with which it disagrees, including whatever is known about joint information:
"{ < x, y > : x E (H & K) and y E <H & K) and x = y}" .
In general, interference could come from any structure of the form "{ < x, y > : x E H and y E K and x E W a y E W . .. }" where Vis not a subset of W. For instance, Finding candidate classes starts with chaining on biconditionals. We implemented the biconditional chaining, but in practice, it's dispensable logical convenience. We want the probability of t. The equality reasoner leads to a set of pairs <X i , Z i >, such that for each i, <IFF t <MEMBER x; Z;)) is true.
For each of these Xi J we have to find the sets to which it is known to belong. There is a choice (we implemented the latter, but now prefer the former): a) chain forward on those sets to which Xi is known to belong, and their supersets, Yj. Then either look for statistical statements We can now explain why (a) seems more attractive than (b). Even with the shortcuts for computing reflection, there are too many proofs attempted.
Instead, chain forward through known inclusion relations using one's favorite set-theoretic axioms. For every set found, one has simultaneously determined a candidate class and identified which other classes it reflects, i.e., which sets are its supersets.
The relations betw�en inference structures direct the search, rather than lead to more proofs.
Reducing the Language.
Lesson:
Set-theoretic language just gets in the way. The rules are too general: use a subset of the rules and restrict the languages over which probability is computed. It is important to represent and manipulate sets like {x : x E Hand y E K and x E V = y E V}.
But for all the effort required to implement this set theoretic structure faithfully, it is quite inexpensive to supply the relevant information manually. In fact, rather than name the set with a complex expression that shows its structure, in practice we found it easier just to give it a basic name and assert the relevant relations to other sets.
We found we could get along with a quite restricted language, where all sets are named by creative intersection. The details are not important. What is important is that the constructions from section 2.3, and the Bayesian constructions can be named with less set-theoretic machinery.
EMORPH is the union of {<x,y>:x=y},and {<x,y,z>: x = y = z}, etc.
(so it acts like it has polymorphic dimension on intersections; "E"for "equality"). Kyburg's system does solve some perplexing questions inherent in evidential reasoning, including:
1) when does an independence assumption conflict with joint information; 2) which conclusion can be drawn, if any, when there is disagreeing evidence; and 3) ho . w to choose between evidence that is strong but ill-founded, and evidence that is well-founded but weak.
The key elements are: 1) the use of intervals, so that probability assertions can vary in strength, and 2) the distinction between frequency and probability assertion, so that conflict among statistical
We implemented the system in some generality, and found that the difficulties were in deciding how much set-theoretic language and how much set theoretic inference to use.
In order to simplify, we studied exactly which inference structures would be useful, of the many that satisfy the definitions. In particular, we know that when there is conflict between two classes, e.g., %(H, The next step is to see how well these ideas fare in applications.
